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Abstract
Different models to study the wealth distribution in an artificial society have con-
sidered a transactional dynamics as the driving force. Those models include a risk
aversion factor, but also a finite probability of favoring the poorer agent in a trans-
action. Here we study the case where the partners in the transaction have a previous
knowledge of the winning probability and adjust their risk aversion taking this infor-
mation into consideration. The results indicate that a relatively equalitarian society
is obtained when the agents risk in direct proportion to their winning probabilities.
However, it is the opposite case that delivers wealth distribution curves and Gini
indices closer to empirical data. This indicates that, at least for this very simple
model, either agents have no knowledge of their winning probabilities, either they
exhibit an “irrational” behavior risking more than reasonable.
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A study of the distribution of the income of workers, companies and countries
was presented, more than a century ago, by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto.
He investigated data of income for different European countries and found a
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power law distribution that seems to be independent on particular economic
condition of each country. He found (1) that the distribution of income and
wealth follows a power law behavior where the cumulative probability P (w)
of people whose income is at least w is given by P (w) ∝ w−α, where the
exponent α is named today Pareto index. The exponent α for several countries
was 1.2 ≤ α ≤ 1.9. However, recent data indicate that, even though Pareto’s
law provides a good fit to the distribution of the high range of income, it does
not agree with observed data over the middle and low range of income. For
instance, data from Japan (2), the United States of America and the United
Kingdom (3; 4; 5) are fitted by a lognormal or Gibbs distribution with a
maximum in the middle range plus a power law for the highest income. The
existence of these two regimes may be qualitatively justified by stating that
in the low and middle income classes the process of accumulation of wealth is
additive, causing a Gaussian-like distribution, while in the high income class
the wealth grows in a multiplicative way, generating the power law tail.
Different models of capital exchange among economic agents have been re-
cently proposed. Most of these models consider an ensemble of interacting
economic agents that exchange a fixed or random amount of a quantity called
“wealth”. In the model of Dragulescu and Yakovenko (3; 6) this parameter
is associated with the amount of money a person has available to exchange,
i. e. a kind of economic “energy” that may be exchanged by the agents in
a random way. The resulting wealth distribution is a Gibbs exponential dis-
tribution, as it would be expected. An exponential distribution as a function
of the square of the wealth is also obtained in an extremal dynamics model
where some action is taken, at each time step, on the poorest agent, trying to
improve its economic state (7; 8). In the case of this last model a poverty line
with finite wealth is also obtained, describing a way to diminish inequalities
in the distribution of wealth (9). In order to try to obtain the power law tail
several methods have been proposed. Keeping the constraint of wealth con-
servation a detailed studied proposition is that each agent saves a fraction -
constant or random - of their resources (6). One possible result of those models
is condensation, i.e. the concentration of all the available wealth in just one
or a few agents. To overcome this situation different rules of interaction have
been applied, for example increasing the probability of favoring the poorer
agent in a transaction (8; 10; 11; 12), or introducing a cut-off that separates
interactions between agents below and above a threshold (13). Most of these
models are able to obtain a power law regime for the high-income class, but
for a limited range of the parameters, while for the low income, the regime can
be approximately fitted by an exponential or lognormal function. However, in
all those models the risk-aversion (or saving propensity) of the agents is de-
termined at random with no correlation with the probability of winning in a
given interaction. Also, possible correlations between wealth and probability
of interaction are not considered.
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Here we assume that the agents have some previous knowledge of their win-
ning probability and they adjust their risk-aversion factor in correlation with
this winning probability. As in previous models we consider a population of
N = 105 interacting agents characterized by a wealth wi and a risk aversion
factor βi. We chose as initial condition for wi a uniform distribution between
0 and 1000 arbitrary units. For each agent i, the number [1 − βi] measures
the percentage of wealth he is willing to risk. At each time step t we select at
random the two agents i and j that will exchange resources. Then, we set the
quantity to be exchanged between these two agents as the minimum of the
available resources of both agents, i.e., dw = min[(1− βi)wi(t); (1− βj)wj(t)].
Finally, following previous works we consider a probability p ≥ 0.5 of favoring
the poorer of the two partners (10; 11),
p =
1
2
+ f ×
|wi(t)− wj(t)|
wi(t) + wj(t)
, (1)
where f is a factor going from 0 (equal probability for both agents) to 1/2
(highest probability of favoring the poorer agent). Thus, in each interaction
the poorer agent has probability p of earn a quantity dw, whereas the richer
one has probability 1 − p. Now we consider that in each transaction both
participants know this probability and adjust their risk-aversion β according
to the value of p. If the agents are “rational” they will risk more when they
have a higher probability of winning so, taking into account that p varies
between 0.5 and 1, we first consider that in each interaction:
βrich=2αr(p− 0.5),
βpoor =2αp(1− p), (2)
with αr and αp ranging from 0 to 1. This correlation between the risk aversion
and p is plotted in Fig. 1, where we change αr and αp in order to display the
possible variations of the rich and poor tactics, starting with a risk-aversion
given by αr = αp = 1 and then decreasing the slope from 2 to 0 (so decreasing
α’s from 1. to 0.) for the richer agent (Fig.1, left panel) or for the poorer agent
(Fig.1, right panel) up to arriving to a constant risk aversion equal to zero.
In Fig. 2 we have plotted the wealth distribution corresponding for changing
strategies of the poorer agent. We have not represented the case when it is the
richer agent strategy that changes because we observe that in this case the
wealth distribution is independent of the changes and is always equal to the
curve (a) of Fig.2. Looking to the (a) curve one observes that a great fraction
of the agents concentrate in a middle class with a wealth very near the average
value and a few agents have wealth bigger than the initial value of 1000. This
is confirmed by the Gini coefficient of this distribution that is very low, equal
to 0.17. On the other hand, the curves (b) to (e) of Fig. 2 correspond to the
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Fig. 1. Rational agents: Risk aversion factor β as a function of p, the probability of
favoring the poorer of the two partners. Left panel: The rich agent, solid lines, change
its behavior going from rational to irrational (lines a to e). Dash line corresponds to
βpoor. Right panel: Here the behavior of the poor agent, solid lines, changes, while
the dash line corresponds to βrich.
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
1000
10000
e
d
c
b
a
h
(w
)
w
Fig. 2. Wealth distribution for the case presented in Fig. 1, right panel, the poor
agents change their strategy
case when the risk-aversion of the poorer agents decreases. As it is expected
the inequality increases when the poor agents risk more (and there is not a
change on the rich side). The number of agents with very low wealth (near
w = 1) increases and for the case where the β of the poor partner is 0 a power
law with an exponent approximately equal to the unity is obtained. The Gini
coefficients also increase as the risk-aversion of the poor partners decreases as
shown in Fig. 5 (open circles), where one can perceive that the Gini coefficients
vary almost linearly from 0.17 to 0.85.
A different behavior is obtained when the agents behave irrationally. Let’s
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modify the behaviors described by equation (2), that is, the agents risk more
when they have a lower chance to win. This situation is represented in Fig.
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Fig. 3. Irrational agents: Risk aversion factor β as a function of p, the probability
of favoring the poorer of the two partners. Left panel: The rich agent, solid lines,
changes its behavior (lines a to e). Dash line corresponds to βpoor. Right panel: The
poor agent changes its behavior, solid lines. Dash line corresponds to βrich.
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Fig. 4. Wealth distribution for the case presented in Fig. 3, left panel, the rich agents
change their strategy.
3. If both of them exhibit an “irrational behavior” the effects are mutually
neutralized and the distribution of wealth exhibited in the curve Fig. 4(a) has
a relatively low Gini coefficient, ≃ 0.37. However, if there is a change in the
strategy of the richer agents the effects are catastrophic for the poorer partners.
This result is shown in curves (b) to (e) of Fig. 4. We can see that the inequality
increases very fast, the wealth distribution approaches to a power law with
an exponent approximately equal to 1.125 and the Gini coefficients (triangles
in Fig. 8) go up to values very near 1., i.e. perfect inequality. On the other
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hand if the poor agents change their strategy there are some minor changes
in the wealth distribution, so we have not plotted it. The Gini coefficients are
between 0.35 and 0.4 (See Fig. 8, squares) with the exception of the last point
that corresponds to a zero risk-aversion for the poor partner.
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Fig. 5. Gini coefficients for rational agents (open circles), and irrational agents when
the richer partner changes its strategy(triangles) or the poorer partner changes its
strategy (squares)
The results are summarized in Fig. 5 where we have plotted the Gini coefficient
in the different situations discussed above. The open circles correspond to the
rational behavior when the strategy of the poorer partners changes from the
rational to decreasing values of β (so, increasing the risk). One can observe
an almost linear increase of the inequality. That could mean that when poor
agents try to improve their situation risking more, either because of lack of
information, or by trying to improve their fortune by betting in high risk
speculation, the results are in the opposite direction increasing inequality. On
the other hand, in the case of irrational behavior, when there is a change in
the strategy of the richer partner (triangles), the Gini coefficient increases very
fast up to very high values (near 1), while if the poorer partner changes its
strategy (squares) there are just minor changes in the inequality. In any case
if one compares our results with Gini coefficient values for real societies, the
values obtained when the rich partner acts “rationally” and the poor partner
acts “irrationally” – risking more than reasonable – are closer to empirical
data, indicating that either the hypothesis of a previous knowledge of the
winning probability is wrong for the poorer partners, either that the poor
agents are in a so bad condition that they prefer to risk even in the case of a
relatively low winning probability.
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